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Abstract 
The social difficulties of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are typically explained as a 
disruption in the Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM) sub-component of the theory of mind 
(ToM) system. In the current paper, we explore the hypothesis that SAM's capacity to 
construct the self-other-object relations necessary for shared-attention arises from a self-
categorization process, which is weaker among those with more autistic-like traits. We 
present participants with self-categorization and shared-attention tasks, and measure their 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Results reveal a negative relationship between AQ and 
shared-attention, via self-categorization, suggesting a role for self-categorization in the 
disruption in SAM seen in ASD. Implications for intervention, and for a ToM model in which 
weak central coherence plays a role are discussed. 
 
Keywords: shared attention; self-categorization; theory of mind; weak central coherence; 
categorization 
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Exploring the cognitive foundations of the Shared Attention Mechanism: Evidence for a 
relationship between self-categorization and shared attention across the autism 
spectrum 
The social difficulties of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are typically explained as 
outcomes of disruption in the ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) system, particularly of the Shared 
Attention Mechanism (SAM; Baron-Cohen, 2005). Disruption in SAM inhibits individuals 
from sharing attention with others, which further impairs downstream abilities in other ToM 
domains, resulting in the social difficulties on which diagnosis is based. Although it is 
descriptively well-elaborated in Baron-Cohen’s (2005) Empathizing System Model, the 
cognitive underpinnings of SAM’s representational capacities are not well understood. In the 
current paper, we hypothesize that SAM relies fundamentally on the cognitive process of 
self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) for its proper 
functioning, and that disruption of this process explains the difficulties in shared attention 
seen on the autism spectrum. We further suggest that understanding self-categorization as the 
cognitive mechanism underlying SAM could lead to a more unified model of ASD, in which 
weak central coherence (WCC) has a role to play in the ToM difficulties. 
The social impairments of ASD have traditionally been understood as a deficit in the 
ToM system (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). Baron-Cohen (2005) suggests that the 
ToM system is composed of six modules, which develop at different developmental periods. 
The Intentionality Detector (ID), The Emotion Detector (TED, and the Eye Direction 
Detector (EDD) develop in early infancy. Maturation of these modules supports the 
development, in later infancy, of the Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM). The development 
of SAM further enables the emergence, in early childhood, of The Empathizing SyStem 
(TESS), and the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). In a typically developing individual, 
these modules function as an interconnected system, enabling him or her to represent, feel, 
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infer, and interpret the mental, emotional and behavioral states of others, and thus to function 
in a socially adaptive manner. However, in people with ASD the functioning of SAM is 
thought to be disrupted. This prevents shared attention behaviors from arising, and constrains 
development of the person’s ability to represent the mental states of others and to function 
adaptively in social interactions. 
According to Baron-Cohen (2005), SAM’s primary contribution to the ToM system is 
to build triadic representations of self, other, and object. These triadic representations allow a 
perceiver to determine if his or her attention and that of another perceiver are directed 
towards the same event or physical object. As a function of this sharing of attention, typically 
developing children will gradually come to share their experiences with, and learn from, 
others, through joint attention behaviors such as gaze monitoring (Loveland & Landry, 1986) 
and proto-declarative pointing (Baron-Cohen, 1989). In children with ASD, on the other 
hand, these joint attention behaviours appear to be impaired (Mastrogiuseppe, Capirci, Cuva 
& Venuti, 2015; Mundy, 2016), and this impairment is known to be predictive of later 
dysfunction in other ToM domains (Mundy, Sigman & Kasari, 1994; Sodian & Kristen-
Antonow, 2015), and in social functioning (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015; Mundy, 1995). 
This body of work provides a well-elaborated account of the functions of SAM and 
the consequences of its functions being diminished. Nevertheless, the precise cognitive 
mechanism responsible for the emergence and construction of self-other-object 
representations is not well understood. Typically, models of shared attention focus on 
understanding the cognitive mechanisms that underpin joint attention behaviors, rather than 
elaborating on the processes involved in producing triadic representations. Edwards, 
Stephenson, Dalmaso and Bayliss (2015), for example, propose the existence of a cognitive 
mechanism that allows a perceiver to respond to the gaze-following behavior of others. 
Similarly, Mundy and Newell (2007) suggest that the joint attention behaviors of responding 
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to joint attention and initiating joint attention rely on the domain-general posterior perceptual 
and the anterior volitional attention systems, respectively. These are important findings that 
chart the developmental trajectory of the antecedents of joint attention behaviors, particularly 
gaze monitoring, gestural communication, and general attention.  However, they do not 
resolve the specific issue of how the cognitive system combines self, other and object into the 
useable and context-specific triadic representations necessary for shared attention. 
Importantly, though, this gap has recently been addressed by theorizing in social 
psychology. Shteynberg (2015) suggests that shared attention arises from a psychological 
‘shared-attention state’, which he defines as “the perception of in-the-moment attention to an 
object from a first-person-plural perspective” (pp. 581)1. The shared-attention state is 
therefore a triadic representation of self, other, and object, where self and other have become 
merged into a psychological “we-mode” (e.g., Searle, 1995). The “we-mode” – also 
commonly referred to as a social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) – itself emerges when a 
perceiver becomes aware that relationally close or socially equivalent others are 
synchronously co-attending to a stimulus. Importantly, the extent to which others are 
perceived to be socially equivalent is a function of the well-elaborated cognitive process of 
self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). In short, by 
recognizing the importance of (1) social identity to shared attention, and (2) self-
categorization to social identity, Shteynberg’s (2015) shared-attention state model provides a 
plausible cognitive process to explain how SAM constructs triadic representations.  
At the broadest level, self-categorization is the process of using social categories (e.g., 
age, gender and many more subtle stimulus groupings) to make sense of social stimuli (e.g., 
persons, traits, behaviors; Skorich & Mavor, 2013) from the perspective of the self. In simple 
terms, it is the process of coming to understand what some social stimulus is by 
understanding what other stimuli it is similar to, and different from, in a particular perceptual 
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context (McGarty, 1999). According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994), self-categories – which can include psychological 
groups as well as aspects of a perceiver’s personal identity – become psychologically 
activated as an interactive function of perceiver, stimulus and situational factors (Oakes, 
Haslam & Turner, 1994). When a social (i.e., group-based) self-category is activated, the 
perceiver comes to define him or herself as equivalent to others in that self-category, such 
that self and other become merged and a social identity (a sense of self and other as “us”) 
emerges. As discussed above, this sense of social identity is hypothesized to lead, inter alia, 
to shared attention (Shteynberg, 2015), and shared attention is hypothesized to give rise to the 
higher-order ToM processes encapsulated in TESS and ToMM (Baron-Cohen, 2005). 
Shteynberg and his colleagues (Shteynberg, 2010; 2014; Shteynberg & Apfelbaum. 
2013; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; Shteynberg, Hirsh, Galinsky & Knight, 2014) have 
amassed a large body of empirical evidence that supports this shared-attention state model. 
For example, across three studies, Shteynberg (2010) found that inducing a shared social 
identity in participants (e.g., “we the blue avatar team”) increased the salience of stimuli to 
which they were co-attending relative to participants for whom no shared social identity was 
induced. Similarly, Shteynberg and Apfelbaum (2013) found that participants who co-
attended with similar others to a written exchange were more likely to model the writing style 
of that exchange than participants who were co-attending with non-similar others. Together,  
this body of work lends strong support for claims that social identity — and the self-
categorization process that makes it possible —  is crucial for entering a shared-attention 
state, which in turn increases the cognitive, emotional and behavioral prominence of co-
attended stimuli. Such findings highlight not only the cognitive processes underlying SAM, 
but also the important consequences that arise from the shared-attention state, and its 
downstream consequences for ToM and social behavior. 
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Given its likely role in the construction of triadic representations as part of SAM and 
SAM’s role in the ToM difficulties of ASD, it is plausible that the self-categorization process 
is implicated in the dysfunction observed in ASD. In the face of dysfunctional self-
categorization, SAM would be unable to construct self-other-object representations, and the 
shared attention observed in typical development would be impaired, resulting in the ToM 
and social difficulties associated with ASD. Importantly, self-categorization has prior 
plausibility as a disrupted process in ASD, because the more general process of 
categorization – of which self-categorization is a special case – is known to be compromised 
in those with ASD (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Gastgeb, Dundas, Minshew & Strauss, 2012). 
Furthermore, like the more general process of categorization, self-categorization is reliant on 
centrally coherent (more holistic/global) processing, which is also known to be ‘weak’ in 
ASD (Happe & Frith, 2006; Frith & Happe, 1994). 
Recent research on the relationship between autistic-like traits, self-categorization, 
and mental state inference also provides evidence for the role of self-categorization in ASD. 
Skorich et al. (2016) presented participants with social information about a variety of target 
people who were members of one of four local categories embedded within one of two global 
categories. This hierarchical social category structure allowed participants to extract a 
categorization pattern at either a more global level or a more local level. Participants were 
then asked to infer the mental states of novel category members, and to complete the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001). 
Results revealed that a higher AQ was associated with more local social categorization, 
which in turn predicted more mental state inferences based on the local social categories. 
These results provided the first direct evidence that the degree of autistic-like traits might be 
predictive of differences in the self-categorization process, which in turn appear to produce 
differences in the pattern of mental state inferences. 
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In the context of the current paper, the results reported by Skorich and colleagues 
(2016) can be interpreted as support for the notion that differences in self-categorization 
across the autism spectrum could be predictive of differences in shared attention tendencies, 
and related to, or causative of, dysfunction in SAM. To investigate this possibility directly, in 
the present study we (1) examine the relationship between self-categorization and shared 
attention, and (2) explore how this relationship manifests itself across a sample of the general 
population who differ in the degree to which they possess autistic-like traits. We employ a 
commonly used social categorization task (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978) in order 
to measure the degree to which participants self-categorize in terms of a particular social 
group and come to view themselves in terms of the corresponding social identity. We also 
manipulate the degree of covariation between the social categories and the social information 
presented in the categorization task to test the exploratory hypothesis that the specific self-
categorization difficulty experienced by those with a high degree of autistic-like traits is one 
of pattern detection (Almeida, Dickinson, Maybery, Badcock, & Badcock, 2010; Frith & 
Happe, 1994). We then present participants with an adapted version of Shteynberg’s (2010) 
shared attention word memory task to measure the degree to which participants’ self-
categorization predicts the degree to which they share attention with similar others. We also 
measured the degree of participants’ autistic-like traits in order to explore its relationship to 
self-categorization and shared attention. 
Consistent with the argument that self-categorization is disrupted in ASD, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1. the degree of a person’s autistic-like traits will be negatively related to the degree of 
self-categorization that they show in the categorization task (captured by a self-
categorization index, SCI, where a positive score indicates typical self-categorization, 
and a score of zero or below indicates no or atypical self-categorization). 
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More specifically, we anticipate that: 
H1a. participants with a low AQ will have an SCI significantly greater than zero, but that 
participants with a high AQ will not have an SCI significantly different from zero. 
H1b: the effect of AQ will be moderated by the degree of covariation across the 
covariation conditions, such that AQ will be more strongly negatively related to self-
categorization in a moderate covariation condition (where the pattern is difficult to 
detect), relative to both high and no covariation conditions (where the pattern is easy 
to detect or there is no pattern to detect). 
In line with the suggestion that ASD is characterized by decreased shared attention, 
we also hypothesize that: 
H2. the degree of a person’s autistic-like traits will be negatively related to the degree of 
shared attention with members of their own social category (ingroup), but will not be 
related to the degree of shared attention with members of the social category to which 
they did not belong (outgroup). 
More specifically, we anticipate that: 
H2a. there will be a difference between ingroup and outgroup shared attention for 
participants with a low AQ, but no difference for those with a high AQ, because low-
AQ participants will show a bias towards words co-attended by ingroup members, 
whereas high-AQ participants will show no such bias. 
Given that self-categorization is known to be a causal antecedent of shared attention 
with ingroup members, we also hypothesize that: 
H3: the SCI will be positively related to ingroup shared attention, but not to outgroup 
shared attention.  
Finally, we hypothesize that: 
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H4. the relationship between autistic-like traits and ingroup shared attention will 
disappear, or be attenuated, when participants’ SCI is added to the model, thus 
demonstrating that self-categorization mediates the relationship between autistic-like 
traits and ingroup shared attention (see Figure 1 for a graphical representation of 
hypotheses). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy-seven participants were recruited via online crowdsourcing 
tool Crowdflower. One hundred and forty-five participants generated a valid Autism-
Quotient score, having provided a response to all 50 items, and were thus retained for all 
subsequent analyses. Of the final sample, 74 participants were female, 65 were male, and 6 
did not indicate their gender. The mean age was 35.52 years with a range from 18 to 72. The 
research was approved by the Australian National University Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Design 
The study employed a three-condition (covariation: zero/moderate/high) between-
participants design, with participants’ AQ included as a continuous predictor. The dependent 
variables were self-categorization score in the categorization task, and ingroup and outgroup 
word memory in the shared attention task. 
Procedure 
The entire study was conducted online, employing Qualtrics survey software to present 
all stimuli and collect all data. 
Phase 1: Avatar Selection. Participants were informed that they would be completing 
a series of cognitive tasks at the same time as five other participants. They were told that each 
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participant, including themselves, would be selecting an avatar to represent them throughout 
the study. Unbeknownst to participants, they were in fact completing the study on their own. 
Participants were then given the choice of three avatars, presented on-screen in random 
order, one above the other. Participants were told that these avatars were the three avatars 
remaining after other participants had selected their avatars. The avatars were androgynous in 
appearance, and differed in terms of facial characteristics, hair length and hair style. Each 
avatar wore a black t-shirt, with the word “Smedd” written prominently on the front. 
Participants selected their avatar by clicking on the avatar of their choice. 
Following avatar selection, participants were asked to provide their name or a 
pseudonym, which, they were told, would be displayed alongside their avatar in all 
subsequent tasks. They were told that other participants would similarly be providing a name 
or pseudonym, which would also be displayed alongside their avatar. 
Participants were then asked to wait until other participants had (supposedly) selected 
their avatars. Participants waited seven seconds before they were told that all participants had 
selected their avatars. 
Phase 2: Categorization Task. Next, participants were given instructions for an 
adapted version of a commonly-used categorization task (Taylor et al., 1978), originally 
developed to explore the extent to which participants use social categories to organise social 
information. Participants were informed that they would be presented with a number of 
statements on-screen, one-by-one, displayed below the avatar of the participant to whom that 
statement was attributed. They were told that each of the participants, including themselves, 
was a member of either group Smedd or group Plibb, and that their group membership would 
be represented by the colour of the t-shirt worn by the avatar – black for Smedd and grey for 
Plibb – and by the word “Smedd” or “Plibb” written prominently across the front of the t-
shirt. Participants were then told that their task was to remember as many of the statements as 
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they could, with particular reference to who performed the behavior. Participants were told 
that the statements would be of the form “[Name], a member of group [Smedd/Plibb], 
[behavior]” for statements attributed to other participants, and “You, a member of group 
Smedd, [behavior]” for statements attributed to themselves. The five names used for the 
ostensible other participants (heretofore referred to as “targets”) were Louise, Holly, Sarah, 
Laura, and Alice. Louise, Holly and the participant were always members of group Smedd, 
and Sarah, Laura and Alice were always members of group Plibb, such that group Smedd and 
group Plibb had three members each. 
Each of the behaviors described in the statements was constructed so as to capture one 
of the Big-Five personality factors of agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, or 
neuroticism (Goldberg, 1990; see Figure 2 for an example agreeableness statement as it 
appeared to participants). Constructing the statements so as to capture these personality 
factors allowed us to test the notion that autistic-like traits would be predictive of decreased 
pattern detection (e.g., Almeida et al., 2010), because we were then able to manipulate the 
covariation between the groups and the personality traits. In the zero-covariation condition, 
the agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and neuroticism statements were equally 
divided between Smedd and Plibb, and between targets. In the moderate-covariation 
condition, 50% of Smedd statements were agreeableness statements, and 50 % of Plibb 
statements were conscientiousness statements, with the remaining statements consisting of an 
equal combination of the remaining trait dimensions. In the high-covariation condition, 75% 
of Smedd statements were agreeableness statements, and 75% of Plibb were concientiousness 
statements, with the remaining statements mapping onto the opposite trait dimension for each 
group. 
In all three conditions, each of the targets, including the participant themselves, was 
attributed with 6 statements. The 36 statements thus created were displayed to participants, 
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one-by-one, in random order, below the appropriate avatar. Each statement stayed on-screen 
for 11 seconds, with a 500ms inter-statement interval. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Phase 3: Attribution Task. Following initial statement presentation, participants were 
re-presented with the 36 behavioral statements from the previous task, along with a further 24 
filler statements, with the avatar, name, and group membership removed. Participants were 
asked to indicate, for each statement, if it was one they had seen before, by clicking on “seen 
before” or “not seen before” displayed on-screen below the statement. If participants 
indicated that they had not seen the statement before, the next statement was displayed. If 
they indicated that they had seen the statement before, they were asked to attribute it to the 
person with whom it had been associated in the previous task, by clicking on the appropriate 
avatar from the six possible avatars displayed below the statement. The avatars, with their 
names below, were presented in three columns below each statement, in a different random 
order for each statement. The 60 statements were randomized and presented on-screen one-
by-one, until participants made a response. 
Phase 4: Shared Attention Task. Participants were next asked to complete a shared 
attention word memory task (Shteynberg, 2010). The task was divided into two almost 
identical parts, each of which consisted of the presentation of two lists of 9 words side-by-
side, followed by a recognition memory task. For each pair of word lists, participants were 
told that they would be paired with two other participants, who were said to be 
simultaneously completing the task. One of these ostensible other participants was said to be 
simultaneously viewing one of the lists of words that the participant was viewing, and the 
other participant was said to be simultaneously viewing the other list. Participants were told 
that the other participants' avatars would appear on screen above the list that they were both 
being presented with. Participants were then told that the participants with whom they would 
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be paired were members of groups Smedd or Plibb, and that participants’ group membership 
would be indicated by their avatar’s t-shirt. 
Participants were then presented with the first two word lists. The list on the left-hand 
side of the screen was displayed below the avatar of a member of group Smedd, and the list 
on the right-hand side was displayed below the avatar of a member of group Plibb (see Figure 
3 for shared attention task as it appeared to participants). Participants were given 30 seconds 
to view the two lists. There was then a 20-second delay before participants were presented 
with the longer list of 18 target words and 18 filler words, from which they were asked to 
click on all those words they could remember from the lists previously presented. Participants 
were given as much time as they needed to complete this word recognition task. 
After completing the first word memory task, participants were presented with the 
second pair of word lists, in which the left/right position of group Smedd and group Plibb 
avatars was swapped relative to the first pair of word lists. In all other respects this second 
word memory task was identical to the first. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Phase 5: Autism-Spectrum Quotient and Demographic Information. Participants 
were next asked to complete the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), 
which captures variability in autistic-like traits across the general population. Participants 
were asked to indicate their agreement with each of the 50 items by clicking on one of the 
four scale-points from “Disagree Strongly” to “Agree Strongly”. Finally, participants were 
asked to indicate their gender, their age, and whether English was their first language. 
Results 
Calculation of Measures 
An AQ score was calculated for each participant in two steps. First, a score of 1 was 
given for responses of “Disagree Strongly” or “Disagree” to reverse-coded items, and for 
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responses of “Agree Strongly” or “Agree” for forward-coded items. These scores were then 
summed to create a final AQ score. A higher score on this measure indicates more autistic-
like traits. The mean AQ in our sample was 21.72, with a range from 2 to 41. 
A self-categorization index (SCI) was calculated by subtracting the number of 
between-category errors (incorrect person, incorrect group) that participants made in the 
attribution task from the number of within-category errors (incorrect person, correct group) 
that they made. A higher SCI score indicates more self-categorization. The mean SCI score in 
our sample was 1.12 with a range from -13 to +18.5. 
A measure of ingroup shared attention was created by counting the number of words 
correctly remembered from the two lists viewed by members of group Smedd. The mean 
ingroup shared attention score was 5.64, with a range from 0 to 9. A measure of outgroup 
shared attention was created by counting the number of words correctly remembered from the 
two lists viewed by members of group Plibb. The mean outgroup shared attention score was 
5.57, with a range from 0 to 9. 
H1: AQ and self-categorization 
A between-participants covariation condition by AQ ANCOVA was conducted on the 
SCI. Consistent with H1, this revealed a main effect of AQ, F(1, 139) = 4.88, p = .029, η2 = 
.032, such that the relationship between AQ and self-categorization was negative, r(145) = -
.184. The main effect of covariation condition was non-significant, F(1, 139) = .196, p = 
.822, η2 = .003, as was the interaction of AQ and covariation condition, F(1, 139) = .808, p = 
.448, η2 = .011. The absence of the interaction indicates no support for H1b. 
Two further analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between AQ and self-
categorization. Participants with an AQ score below the median score of 22 were classified as 
low-AQ, while those with an AQ score above 22 were classified as high-AQ. Supporting 
H1a, the mean SCI score of low-AQ participants was significantly greater than 0 (M = 2.41, 
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SD = 4.7), t(74) = 4.41, p < .001, indicating that these participants self-categorized in terms 
of group Smedd. Also in line with H1a, the mean SCI score of the high-AQ group was not 
significantly different from 0 (M = –.22, SD = 4.22), t(71) = .436, p = .664, indicating that 
these participants did not self-categorize in terms of group Smedd. 
H2: AQ and ingroup and outgroup shared attention 
A between-participants covariation condition by AQ ANCOVA was conducted on the 
ingroup shared attention measure. Supporting H2, this revealed a main effect of AQ, F(1, 
139) = 4.37, p = .038, η2 = .03, such that the relationship between AQ and ingroup shared 
attention was negative, r(145) = -.177. The main effect of covariation condition was non-
significant, F(1, 139) = 1.163, p = .315, η2 = .016, as was the interaction of AQ and 
covariation condition, F(1, 139) = 1.627, p = .200, η2 = .023. 
A between-participants covariation condition by AQ ANCOVA was conducted on the 
outgroup shared attention measure. Consistent with H2, this revealed no main effect of AQ, 
F(1, 139) = 1.804, p = 1.81, η2 = .013, no main effect of covariation condition, F(1, 139) = 
.251, p = .778, η2 = .004, and no interaction of AQ and covariation condition, F(1, 139) = 
.577, p = .563, η2 = .008. 
Two further analyses were conducted to explore the difference between ingroup and 
outgroup shared attention for those with a higher AQ and for those with a lower AQ. 
Supporting H2a, low-AQ (<22) participants showed significantly more ingroup shared 
attention (M = 6.27, SD = 1.74) than outgroup shared attention (M = 5.93, SD = 1.99), t(74) = 
1.99, p = .05, indicating a tendency to share attention more with ingroup members than 
outgroup members. Also in line with H2a, in high-AQ (>22) participants, this difference 
between ingroup (M = 4.99, SD = 2.40) and outgroup (M = 5.19, SD = 2.53) shared attention 
was non-significant, t(71) = -1.02, p = .311, indicating no clear tendency to share attention 
more with ingroup members than outgroup members. 
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H3: Self-categorization and ingroup and outgroup shared attention 
Next, the relationship between SCI and ingroup and outgroup shared attention was 
explored. Supporting H3, this revealed a positive relationship with ingroup shared attention, 
r(145) = .173, p = .037, but no significant relationship with outgroup shared attention, r(145) 
= .136, p = .104.  
H4: Self-categorization as a mediator of the relationship between AQ and ingroup 
shared attention 
Finally, the mediating role of self-categorization in the relationship between AQ and 
ingroup shared attention was tested by way of a between-participants covaration condition by 
AQ ANCOVA, in which the SCI was entered as a covariate. Supporting H4, this revealed 
that the previously significant relationship between AQ and ingroup shared attention became 
non-significant, F(1, 139) = 3.16, p = .077, η2 = .020. This suggests that the relationship 
between AQ and ingroup shared attention is fully mediated by self-categorization (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; see Figure 4). 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Discussion 
The current study was designed to explore whether the cognitive process of self-
categorization lies at the heart of the representational capacities of SAM, and whether 
disrupted self-categorization across the autism-spectrum is predictive of differences in shared 
attention tendencies. We hypothesized that the degree of autistic-like traits would negatively 
predict self-categorization (H1). Our results provided support for this hypothesis, and also for 
the more specific prediction (H1a) that low-AQ participants would show self-categorization 
(having an SCI significantly greater than zero), but that high-AQ would not. We also 
expected that this relationship might be moderated by the degree of manipulated covariation 
(H1b), but we found no support for this hypothesis.  
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We further hypothesized that the degree of autistic-like traits would negatively predict 
ingroup shared attention, but not outgroup shared attention (H2). Again, results provided 
support for this hypothesis, and for the more specific prediction (H2a) that low-AQ 
participants would share attention more with ingroup than outgroup members, but that high-
AQ participants would not.  
We also hypothesized that the degree of self-categorization would positively predict 
ingroup shared attention but not outgroup shared attention (H3), and that self-categorization 
would mediate the relationship between autistic-like traits and ingroup shared attention (H4). 
Both of these hypotheses were supported, providing evidence that self-categorization is the 
mechanism that underpins the relationship between AQ and ingroup shared attention. The 
null relationship between self-categorization and outgroup shared attention also acts as a 
comparison control, suggesting that shared attention might be evident only when shared 
(ingroup) social identity has been made salient to the perceiver. However, further work 
including an experimentally manipulated control condition needs to be conducted, in order to 
explore more rigorously whether shared self-categorization is a pre-requisite for shared 
attention.  
Taken together these results provide the first empirical support for the novel 
theoretical propositions that: (1) self-categorization may underlie the representational 
capacities of SAM; and (2) decreased self-categorization related to the degree of a person’s 
autistic-like traits is predictive of decreased shared attention tendencies. These results have at 
least four important implications for ongoing research.  
First, these results have implications for our understanding of the cognitive 
differences of individuals at the higher end of the autism-spectrum. More specifically, 
evidence that autistic-like traits are predictive of decreased self-categorization, and therefore 
of a decreased tendency to construct relevant social identities, provides support for the 
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suggestion that dysfunction in self-categorization might be at the heart of the social 
difficulties of ASD (Skorich et al., 2016). In the absence of these social identities, a person 
with more autistic-like traits, and perhaps those diagnosed with ASD, would be less able to 
enter a shared-attention state, would be less likely to engage in joint attention behaviors, and 
would therefore be delayed in developing the higher-order ToM skills of affective and 
cognitive empathizing. Without these higher-order representational capacities, a person 
would then show all the difficulties in social functioning associated with ASD (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985). 
Second, by placing self-categorization at the heart of shared attention, the current 
results provide novel avenues for exploring joint attention behaviors, and for developing 
interventions based around expanded understanding of these domains. In a recent meta-
analytic review, Murza, Schwartz, Hahs-Vaughn and Nye (2016) found that joint attention 
interventions for children with ASD are generally effective in increasing positive outcomes in 
social functioning and communication, but the specific intervention factors responsible for 
these positive outcomes was unclear. By enhancing our understanding of the cognitive 
underpinnings of shared attention, the present results provide opportunities to pinpoint these 
factors more precisely, and hence to design more focused interventions. If self-categorization 
is fundamental to shared attention, then inducing self-categorization in joint attention 
interventions should increase their efficacy, which could be achieved by behavioral means, or 
via more cognitive-based strategies. In the former (behavioral) category, selective imitation 
could be used, as recent evidence suggests that selective imitation of play behavior by parents 
– which plausibly increases the child’s sense of shared self-categorization with their parents 
(Lakens, 2010) – is effective in fostering the development of shared attention in children with 
ASD (Gulsrud, Helleman, Shire & Kasari, 2015; Ingersoll, 2012). In the latter (cognitive) 
category, more focused interventions could be created by adapting computational models of 
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category learning (e.g., Love, Medin & Gureckis, 2004) for shared attention situations. 
Attentional focus, background knowledge, situational goals, the accessibility of particular 
self-categories in working memory, the categorical relations between self, other and object – 
all of which are important factors in computational models of categorization and self-
categorization – could all be explicitly manipulated in joint attention interventions. These 
joint attention interventions could then also feed into evidence-based social skills programs 
(e.g., the Secret Agent Society; Beaumont, Rotolone & Sofronoff, 2015, or the PEERS 
program, Mandelberg et al., 2014), thus also enhancing their efficacy. As well as the more 
positive outcomes we predict from such enhanced interventions, the increased understanding 
of the cognitive processes underlying shared attention should also lead to greater 
understanding of the shared attention phenomenon itself, and of the behaviors that arise from 
it. 
Third, by conceptualizing ASD explicitly as a disorder of self-categorization, we also 
see particular prospects for developing interventions based around social identity approaches 
to health and well-being (e.g., along lines suggested by Haslam, Jetten, Postmes & Haslam, 
2009; Jetten, Haslam & Haslam, 2012). In this regard it is notable that people with ASD 
suffer from significantly higher levels of depression (Ghaziuddin, Ghaziuddin & Greden, 
2002) and anxiety (White, Oswald, Ollendick & Scahill, 2009) than the neurotypical 
population. Importantly, though, recent research has pointed to the critical role played by 
social identities in these phenomena (e.g., Cruwys, Dingle, Haslam, Haslam, Jetten & 
Morton, 2013). If, as these results suggest, ASD is a disorder of self-categorization in which 
difficulties in constructing social identities are evident, then it is quite likely that the 
decreased well-being seen in people with ASD could be a direct result of a social identity 
deficit. Accordingly, interventions that create the opportunity for people to develop, maintain 
and enhance social identities – which have shown great promise in decreasing depression and 
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anxiety in neurotypicals (Haslam, Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle & Chang, 2016) – might be 
adapted specifically for an ASD population, with the goal of developing social identities in 
those for whom this process is otherwise challenging.  
Finally, the current results speak to the possibility of developing a more integrated 
understanding of ASD. As things stand, ASD is typically understood to be a ‘fractionated’ 
disorder, characterized by a number of distinct but co-occurring clusters of features 
(Brunsdon & Happe, 2014). As discussed above, ToM dysfunction is understood to be at the 
heart of the social difficulties of ASD, but people with ASD also show a number of other 
cognitive-perceptual differences, many of which have been attributed to a tendency towards 
weak central coherence (WCC; Frith & Happe, 1994), or some variant thereof, such as 
enhanced perceptual processing (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert & Burack, 2006). 
Importantly, the present results speak to the possibility of integrating these WCC features 
with the ToM difficulties. Categorization, including self-categorization, is known to be 
affected in ASD (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Skorich et al., 2016), a general impairment which 
has been attributed to a tendency towards WCC. Yet if self-categorization is at the heart of 
shared attention, and it is weak at the higher ends of the autism spectrum, as these results 
suggest, then it is plausible that the ToM difficulties of ASD are outcomes of WCC via a 
dysfunctional self-categorization process. Importantly, neurological and developmental 
evidence also appears to support this account, as self-categorization and ToM processes – 
including shared attention – activate overlapping neural substrates in the medial pre-frontal 
cortex (Molenberghs & Morrison, 2014; Mundy, Gwaltney & Henderson, 2010; Redcay, 
Kleiner & Saxe, 2012; Telzer, Ichien & Qu, 2015), and it also appears that the self-
categorization system develops at the same age as, or perhaps earlier than, early joint 
attention (Elison et al., 2013; Grossman & Johnson, 2010; Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater & 
Pascalis, 2002; Sanefuji, Ohgami & Hashiya, 2006), at somewhere between 3 and 9 months. 
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This suggests that an integrated understanding of ASD informed by our analysis and this 
convergent evidence has the potential to lead to a better understanding of the cognitive 
processes affected in the disorder, the neurological systems that underpin those processes, 
and the genetic and environmental bases of dysfunction in those systems. Importantly too, by 
integrating insights from multiple sub-disciplines in psychology (cognitive, clinical and 
social), this approach offers the prospect of a properly bio-psycho-social model of the 
condition in which all of these dimensions are taken equally seriously. 
Limitations 
Despite the promise of developing this more unified cognitive account of ASD, it is 
important to note the limitations of the current research. First, the sample is drawn from the 
general population, rather than from an ASD clinical population, and therefore the results 
speak most directly to the ‘broader autism phenotype’ (Piven, Palmer, Jacobi, Childress & 
Arndt, (1997) rather than to ASD per se. Second, the cross-sectional nature of the study, in 
conjunction with the adult sample, makes it difficult to draw inferences about the 
developmental dynamics associated with SAM – which are known to be particularly 
important with regard to the downstream consequences for social functioning (Baron-Cohen, 
2005) – and how these might relate to differences in self-categorization. Most importantly, 
however, the methodology of the study reported in this paper does not allow for strong causal 
claims to be made. On the basis of Shteynberg’s (2010) shared-attention model, we discuss 
our results predominantly in the context of the theoretically plausible hypothesis that self-
categorization might underlie shared attention. Our results could, however, be interpreted as 
revealing at least three alternative causal relationships. 
Specifically, research has shown that better recognition memory can arise as a function 
of joint attention, in the absence of an explicit manipulation of self-categorization. For 
example, Striano, Chen, Cleveland and Bradshaw (2006) have shown that 9-month old 
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infants looked at a novel toy longer when an experimenter alternated their gaze between the 
toy and the infant – in a joint attention condition – compared to a condition in which the 
experimenter alternated their gaze between the toy and a spot on the ceiling – in an object 
only condition. This suggests that, in very early development, gaze cues to joint attention 
may lead to enhanced processing of objects in the absence of self-categorization (see also, 
Böckler, Knoblich & Sebanz, 2011; Boothby, Clark & Bargh, 2014; Frischen & Tipper, 
2004; Lindemann, Nuku, Rueschemeyer & Bekkering, 2011). In this context, our results 
could be interpreted as showing that self-categorization is sufficient for shared attention, but 
that it is perhaps not necessary. 
Relatedly, the research of Striano and colleagues (2006) could be interpreted as 
demonstrating that joint attention precedes self-categorization. Indeed, Pellicano and Macrae 
(2009) found that mutual eye gaze facilitated sex categorization of faces over and above an 
averted gaze condition. Further, their results revealed that this effect only emerged for 
typically developing children, but not for children with ASD. These results suggest that 
mutual eye gaze – and thus joint attention – can in fact be a determinant of categorization, 
and that this process is disrupted in children with ASD. With this in mind, our results could 
be interpreted as revealing that shared attention brings about self-categorization of self and 
relevant ingroup members, rather than the reverse. 
Finally, as with all experimental research, it is also possible that a third, unidentified 
process is a causal antecedent of both joint attention and self-categorization, such that neither 
of these processes precedes or produces the other. We maintain, however, that the hypothesis 
that self-categorization is fundamental to shared-attention remains particularly plausible, as 
its constituent assumptions are well supported both theoretically (Shteynberg, 2015; Turner et 
al., 1987; 1994) and empirically (Skorich et al., 2016; Shteynberg, 2010; Shteynberg & 
Apfelbaum, 2013; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; Shteynberg et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
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categorization – and its social equivalent self-categorization – is a ubiquitous process 
(Bruner, 1957; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994), necessary for all perceptual sense-making 
operations in which the stimulus field is partitioned into meaningful entities, such as the 
process of determining self-other-object relations in shared attention situations2. 
Nevertheless, future research in which self-categorization is manipulated experimentally is 
essential in order to more robustly establish the causal paths underlying the relationship 
between self-categorization and shared-attention observed in the current study. 
Conclusion 
In the current paper, we sought to test the idea, derived from Shteynberg’s (2015) 
shared-attention state model, that SAM might be reliant on self-categorization for its proper 
functioning, and that weaker self-categorization could explain the decreased shared attention 
seen in those with more autistic-like traits. Our results provide support for this account, which 
we suggest could lead to a more unified model of ASD. However, a number of avenues 
remain to be explored in future research. These include more rigorously exploring the causal 
relationships between self-categorization and shared attention, specifying the precise self-
categorization sub-processes that might be affected in ASD, and investigating their 
significance both for the neurological and genetic basis of the condition, and for intervention. 
Our hope is that the present research convinces researchers of the value of such exploration 
and encourages them to participate in what will, of necessity, be a collaborative endeavour. 
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Footnotes 
1. Superficially, the triadic representations described by Baron-Cohen (2005) and the 
shared-attention state described by Shteynberg (2010) appear to be distinct forms of 
cognitive representation. Multidimensional models of self-categorization (e.g., see 
McGarty, 1999, pp. 34-35, 119-120), however, suggest that self, other, and object 
can simultaneously be viewed in terms of their triadic relations and in terms of a 
first-person plural representation. 
2. There is good reason to believe that categorization – and its social corollary self-
categorization – is a basic cognitive process, because its primary function of 
dividing sensory information into units of meaning is necessary for any adaptive 
response to the external environment. Nonetheless, it is possible that categorization 
and self-categorization can only arise following particular, specific inputs from the 
environment (consistent with a neuroconstructivist approach; Mareschal, 2011), 
such that the causals paths underlying a complex process such as shared attention 
would be dynamic and multi-directional. Mapping out this interplay in future 
research is crucial to understanding the causal antecedents of shared attention and 
social perception more generally. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the research hypotheses 
Figure 2. Example statement and associated avatar from the self-categorization task. 
Figure 3. Example word lists and associated avatars from the shared attention task. 
Figure 4. The relationship between autism quotient and ingroup shared attention, via self-
categorization. *p < .05 
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